Theoretical perspectives that give primacy to ideological or structural determinism have dominated criminological analysis of the 2011 English 'riots'. This paper provides an alternative social psychological perspective through detailed empirical analysis of two of these riots. We utilise novel forms of data to build triangulated accounts of the nature of the events and explore the perspectives of participants. We assert these riots cannot be adequately understood merely in terms pre-existing social understandings and political realities and that identity based interactional crowd dynamics were critically important. The paper demonstrates the value of the social identity approach in providing criminological theory with a richer and deeper perspective on these complex social phenomena.
Introduction
Crowd events are sites in which we can both 'read' social identities and social representations, but also see how they come to be redefined (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher 1987 Reicher , 2001 Stott & Drury, 2000) . For these reasons, it has been argued that studies of the crowd, far from being seen as peripheral to the core concerns of the social sciences, should rather be placed at the very centre (Reicher, 2011) . That is why it is encouraging to see recent criminological publications that use the 2011 English riots in order to debate the ways in which contemporary ideologies and political divisions frame criminal activity (e.g. Akram, 2014; Jeffery, Ibrahim & Waddington, 2015; Jeffery & Jackson, 2012; Moran & Waddington, 2015; Moxon, 2011; Newburn, 2015a,b; Newburn et al., 2015; Treadwell et al, 2013) . These studies take the voice of rioters seriously and start from the premise that we have much to learn from 'reading the riots'.
We see this as little short of a paradigm shift in the interdisciplinary understanding and study of crowds, of crowd criminality, and of criminality more generally. However, as with any such shift, it does not indicate the production of a new consensus. Rather, it signifies the emergence of novel questions around which debate is focused and assertions differ. In this paper we point to some of these questions -empirical, theoretical and methodological. We use these to frame an empirical study of the 2011 'disorder' in Tottenham and Hackney, which stakes our position on what can be learnt from these riots and demonstrates the value of interdisciplinary approaches to the understanding of riots.
Theoretical questions and controversies.
When it comes to asking what precisely the 2011 English riots tell us, the emerging criminological literature divides loosely into two camps. In the one, it is argued that, while the initial outbreak in Tottenham may have been linked to 'racial' tensions, what followed was acquisitive and nihilistic, characterised by looting and general 'disorder'. It was not so much a reflection of political grievances but of the domination of consumer ideology and culture (Moxon, 2011) . Perhaps the most comprehensive statement of this position comes from Treadwell et al. (2013) , who argue that an ideology of neo-liberalism has undermined and substituted 'political solidarity' within society. In its place has emerged a form of atomised and marginalised individualism, and the 'inarticulate and destructive dissatisfaction ' (p. 3) of such subjects found its expression in the riots. In the other, focus is given to background grievances, which it is argued persisted even as the riots spread (Moran & Waddington, 2015; Waddington, 2012) . From this perspective both the riots and the looting "needs to be seen through a political lens" (Newburn et al., 2015 (Newburn et al., , p. 1000 . When it comes to the nature of these grievances, the two prime candidates are racism and poverty. To cite Jefferson (2012, p. 9 ) the riots were situated: "in relation to the angry, ongoing story of police-black relations, racism, the criminalisation of black youth, growing poverty and deprivation, chronic youth unemployment".
To contend that riots exist in relation to structural inequalities or background ideologies is not to provide a detailed explanation of how they relate. Indeed, criminologists have historically argued that there cannot be a simple deterministic relationship between 'higher order' structural variables and riots.
Instead it has been emphasised that adequate theorisation requires conceptualisation of social psychological variables. For example, Useem and Kimball (1987) contend that there has been a tendency for criminological accounts of prison riots to either ignore social psychological levels of analysis entirely or draw selectively upon social psychological theory in ways that best support structural explanations. They state that to adequately explain patterns of rioting in US prisons theoretical accounts must draw upon the concept of social identity as a mediating variable, since "identification theory plausibly accounts retrospectively for variation in riot activity" (p.116). Sparks et al (1994) also assert that beliefs about legitimacy are central for understanding the maintenance and breakdown of 'order' in British prisons. Moreover, Carrabine (2005) argues that structural factors merely explain why a riot is structurally likely and that to adequately account for specific incidents of riot "attention must be paid to the 'foreground ' of interaction" (p.907) .
This need for a theoretical account of the mediating role played by social psychological variables such as identity, legitimacy and interaction is also evident with respect to the patterning of the 2011 'riots'. Even when all the overarching conditions pointed towards disorder, rioting was not inevitable. Thus while rioting developed in cities such as Manchester and Nottingham it did not take in other cities with similar structural conditions such as Leeds and Sheffield (Guardian/LSE, 2011; Newburn, 2015a) . This suggests that what is critical is the way that distal social conditions framed other processes that ultimately determined whether conflict did or did not escalate (see, for instance, Moran & Waddington, 2015; Newburn 2015a; Reicher & Stott, 2011; Waddington et al, 1987) .
It follows then that the relationship between social context and collective action in riots is inherently social-psychological. However, there remains considerable suspicion towards psychological analysis of riots. Akram (2014) , for instance, groups together all psychological approaches from Le Bon onwards and criticises them for obscuring the relationship between rioters, riots and society. This is ironic, because contemporary psychological crowd theory emerged precisely as a critique of Le Bon's de-socialised understandings of the self and social action.
This social identity approach (Turner et al., 1987) to crowds seeks precisely to understand the ways that crowd action relates to social context -in terms of broader societal and more immediate interactional dynamics of crowd events (Reicher, 1987 (Reicher, , 1996 Stott & Drury, 2000 , 2016 Stott & Reicher, 1998a) .
The starting point for the social identity model of crowd behaviour (Reicher, 1987) is that individuals define themselves and act not only in terms of their idiosyncratic personal identities but also as members of socially determined historical categories such as 'race', gender or class. When salient in the selfsystem, these social identities enable individuals to make sense of their collective position in relation to other social groups and act collectively within that relationship. For example, Reicher (1984 Reicher ( , 1987 provides an analysis of the inner city 'riot' in the St Pauls area of Bristol in the summer of 1980. He showed that the behavioural patterns evident within the riot were intelligible in terms of the racialised self-understandings of crowd members -understandings that developed from the oppressive practices of agencies of the state such as the police (cf. Scarman, 1981) . The concept of social identity thus links subjects and their behaviour to broader ideologies and social structural relations.
However, one of the striking features of St Pauls, and of riots more generally, is that they don't just reflect existing social relations but serve to transform them.
This realisation led to the development of an Elaborated Social Identity Model of crowd behaviour (ESIM). ESIM explains when such change does (and does not) occur by taking account of the proximal social context. Crowd events are typically intergroup encounters, and ESIM addresses the dynamics between groups within crowd events. For instance, police use of coercive force, when perceived as both illegitimate and indiscriminate, can create the proximal social conditions through which previously diverse crowd participants become united and empowered through sharing an 'anti-police' identity (Reicher, 1996 (Reicher, , 2011 Stott & Drury, 2000; Stott & Reicher, 1998a) . Newburn (2015b) acknowledges that a social identity approach to crowds has the potential to provide clarity concerning the ways in which riots unfold and relate to social realities. Nonetheless while his study provides an in-depth analysis of the nature and centrality of intergroup interactions it explores only how these impacted upon the limits of the spread of the 2011 riots; why riots did not happen. This paper therefore builds upon Newburn's (2015b) contribution by providing an ESIM-based interactionist analysis of how and why some of the rioting did take place. But before we present this analysis, it is necessary to address what evidence is needed to sustain an analysis of riots, and how can one obtain it?
Methodology
Riots are difficult to study. They are relatively unpredictable, fast moving, and dangerous. Moreover, even if one were lucky enough to be on hand, people are often not inclined to stop and talk to a researcher. Consequently, the most abundant data source is post hoc accounts, which predominate in the literature (e.g. Guardian/LSE, 2011; Newburn et al, 2015; Treadwell et al, 2013) . It is easy to dismiss such accounts on epistemological grounds. For example, P. A. J. Waddington (1991 Waddington ( , 1994 questions the assertion of Benyon (1984 Benyon ( , 1987 ) that the 1980s riots in England were a form of sub-cultural political protest, socially determined against a backdrop of deprivation and racist policing (e.g. Scarman, 1981) . Waddington questions these theoretical assertions because the post-hoc accounts on which such analyses are based "may be an example of post-riot ideology" (1991; p. 234 ; see also Stott, 2016) . Winlow et al. (2015) also use epistemological arguments to challenge studies of the 2011 riots that they argue rely too heavily on participant accounts (p. 138).
There is merit in such criticism, but it is important not to overstate the case. In this regard we have much to learn from social historians who, since the 1960s, have been developing a 'history from below ' (e.g. Rudé, 1964 (Reddy, 1977) .
We are in a more fortunate situation than they. We have both records of what was done in the riots and participants' accounts of what they did. Accordingly, we are in a position to employ a strategy of triangulation, whereby we take accounts seriously to the extent that they accord with patterns of action and provide a parsimonious understanding of those patterns. This is a strategy used successfully many times before (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Drury & Stott, 2001; Reicher 1984 Reicher , 1996 Stott & Drury, 2000; Stott & Reicher, 1998b) . However, in 2011, unlike previous waves of UK riots, the explosion of social media provides us an extra resource: a rich corpus of video recordings taken during the events in question. In this paper, we are therefore in a position to triangulate not only what happened during the riots with what was said afterwards, but also to triangulate post-hoc with contemporaneous accounts. When all of these converge, we are in a strong position to make claims about the nature and significance of events. Certainly, it can no longer be claimed that accounts are simply post-riot ideology.
Data sources
Of course, there have been multiple analyses of the English riots that focus on general details and chronology (Briggs, 2012; Guardian/LSE, 2011; MPS, 2012; Riot Communities & Victims Panel, 2012) . There are studies using Ministry of Justice statistics to describe global patterns of damage and looting (Ball & Drury, 2012; Newburn, et al, 2015) . There are studies that describe the clustering of events (e.g., Baudains et al., 2012; Guardian/LSE, 2011) along with the characteristics of the people that were arrested and convicted for involvement in them (Stanko & Dawson, 2012) . But, to our knowledge, there is as yet no published peer reviewed study that provides in depth-triangulated analysis of the pattern of collective behaviour within any of the specific riots of August 2011.
Given their scale and scope it is impossible to present a detailed analysis of all the riots that occurred in 2011. In this paper we have therefore concentrated on two case studies, chosen for their significance within the overall events. The first is the Tottenham 'riot' of August 6 th since this is universally acknowledged as the 'catalyst' riot, and generally accepted to be rooted in political grievances. The second is the Hackney riot of 8th August, probably the largest and most violent of all. This allows us to examine issues of the importance of consumerist and of political motivations as the riots spread beyond Tottenham.
Our data is drawn from various sources. Between September and November 2011 we collected thirty-eight videos posted on the Internet and multiple photographs 1 . In the main these videos comprised footage taken directly in the vicinity of the events by journalists, eyewitnesses and participants. They also included mainstream media footage. Videos were identified and accessed firstly using keyword searches. Subsequently, we followed automatically-generated 
The emergence of conflict
Feeling further aggrieved and ignored, the family and community leaders left the demonstration at around 8.00 pm. At around 8.30 pm an empty police car parked adjacent to the station was attacked. The initial police reaction was to deploy a Police Support Unit (PSU 2 ) in full 'protective equipment' into the street immediately outside the police station. As is standard practice, the police cleared everyone from the roadway to create "a safe working area" (MPS, 2012; p.40) during which time the police acknowledge, "numerous missiles were being thrown at officers" (ibid).
In contrast it is evident that some within the crowd were unaware of any surrounding 'disorder' and that as such they saw this police action as an unwarranted and indiscriminate aggressive intervention. For example, a young woman was apparently pushed over and struck by the police. While there is some dispute about the time at which (or even whether) this episode occurred (Brown, 2011) After already feeling aggrieved about the lack of communication from the police concerning the shooting of Mr Duggan, accounts from witnesses suggest that police intervention outside the police station added a further sense of illegitimacy, which in turn fuelled the subsequent conflict.
Patterns of conflict
A PSU from the Territorial Support Group 3 arrived outside the police station at 9.10pm. By this time a large crowd had gathered on the High Road some 150 metres to the north of the police station. Two police cars, parked in roads adjacent to the police station were pushed out onto the High Road and set alight. The fire rapidly spread to the adjacent William Hill bookmakers and flats above.
Shortly afterwards a double-decker bus a little further north on the High Road was set alight and was soon burning fiercely enough to damage nearby housing.
However, in each case, residents were evacuated without being harmed.
Meanwhile, to the south of the police station, PSUs equipped with riot helmets and shields and with batons drawn had begun to force everyone on the streets further down the High Road, toward the junction with Monument Way. A crowd, mostly composed of white people, were standing watching the events unfold.
Some chanted "whose streets, our streets" and "get the police off our streets'".
Missiles smashed onto the roadway in front of the police line. [V3] As with the situation to the north, the attacks at this stage were targeted primarily against police and those associated with them. There was sporadic damage to other targets, either 'collateral' (as in the fires at the bookmakers and above) or deliberate (as in a fire started in a pile of rubbish outside a community centre to the west of the High Road). But in neither case did such attacks appear to gain collective support.
In relation to the former incident, an eyewitness recalled how crowd members actively intervened to alert residents and ensure they evacuated properties at risk from the conflagration. In the latter incident, as the blaze began to get out of control, a fire engine arrived. The fire officers doused the flames, unmolested by the watching crowd. Contrast this with the police carrier vans which, at more or less the same time, were driving up the nearby High Road. These were pelted with missiles. Here also, a third parked police car was attacked and set alight
By midnight, the police had pushed the crowd some distance up the High Road to the North. As they did so, the rioting intensified. 
This is what happens [pointing to the burning building] when the police take things into their own hands and shoot people for no reason... They have to understand that they cannot go around shooting people for no reason…. The people are fighting back and they will fight back. This is not the end, believe me this will carry on [V4].

Points of significance
There are four points we wish to raise from this analysis. properties took place they appear to be patterned in the sense that 'insider' businesses may suffer small scale attacks, but crowd members tend not to join in and sometimes actively prevent further damage. Fourth, there is some evidence of change in emphasis during the riot. By the end of the evening, there is greater evidence of crowd members being celebratory and of changed power relations with the police, a change also noted by others (Guardian/LSE, 2011). This raises the suggestion that 'rioters' were able to challenge the police with impunity, one index of which is the increasing inability of the police to prevent acts of criminality. This suggests a changed meaning and a politicisation of property damage; crowd members come to see and celebrate such actions as a sign of police impotence. In this sense CarpetRight is as iconic for the crowd as for the media, albeit signifying very different things.
In sum, then, our analysis confirms the importance of a situated interactional analysis of riot rather than merely trying to read the events in terms of broad background grievances or ideologies. It also shows how these interactions may produce changed social relations and changed social understandings. More concretely, the pattern of events does suggest that a sense of police (and criminal justice) illegitimacy was central to the developing pattern of events. The Tottenham riot was in the sense 'political', in that it appears to have embodied a power struggle between a racialised community and the police. This is not to deny that attacks on the police opened the way to 'consumerist' looting. But even here we agree with Newburn et al (2015) that at times there appears to have been political dimensions to such behaviour in terms of what was looted, how it was looted and how some looting may have been a reflection on policecommunity relations. Nonetheless, our analysis is limited because it is isolated to precipitating events and we have yet to explore the explanatory power of a social identity approach with regard to the 'contagion' of the rioting beyond Tottenham. To this end we now turn to our second analysis.
Analysis 2: Hackney, Monday 8 th August.
Background and the emergence of conflict
There are considerable similarities in the broader background of Haringey and Hackney. In Hackney, black people are three times more likely to be stopped and searched compared to whites (HREC, 2010; see also Hohl, Stanko and Newburn, 2012) . Indeed, just five days before the riot, 300 police officers mounted dawn raids on 32 addresses in the predominantly 'non-white' Pembury Estate. By now, some 6,000 riot-trained police had been deployed onto the streets of London (MPS, 2012) . If the previous riots had made many young people, especially black youth, more suspicious of them, so it is likely that they made the police more suspicious of those congregating on the streets. Moreover, in the light of emerging criticisms of 'soft policing' in Tottenham and elsewhere 4 , the pressure on officers was to be more, rather than less, interventionist. In such a climate, it was all too easy for mutual distrust and expectation to turn into the dynamics of conflict.
This potential was crystallised in an interaction that immediately preceded the onset of widespread violence. A group of police officers stopped and searched two black men in the Narrow Way, near the top end of Mare Street. Video footage shows the two men being manhandled by the officers; one was handcuffed, and both men were angered by the fact that they had been stopped. As they were being interviewed, a policeman with a dog forcefully instructed the men to "move" while ignoring the white journalist standing directly next to him.
The men refused and one gesticulated to the journalist shouting angrily "we are all equal, tell me to move, then tell the white man to move". Other police officers, some with dogs then also intervened and the men were forced to run away. One of them again explained how they felt:
We was all there, they just set the dogs on us. Told us to go up here and set the dogs on us. I've been bitten four times by the dogs... I'm not violent. My hands are up in the air while I'm being bitten, what's happening?...The one thing I want to know is why is it that if someone gets off a bus with their child and wants to go home why must they be bitten by dogs and charged down another road? [V9]
By this point, a small crowd had gathered to watch the two men complaining about what they saw as illegitimate and indiscriminate police action. While they were doing so a police officer released his dog onto its long lead. As it attacked, the crowd scattered. The journalist once more caught up with and interviewed the men. This time, they explicitly made their own recent experience of police illegitimacy emblematic of the experiences of the community as a whole and used this to ground a commitment to collective defiance:
You see half of the people in this community have all got a story to tell about the fucking police and individual brutality… So when they come out on our streets and tell us we must do what we are told and we are all together! What do they expect? We ain't fucking going nowhere. [V9]
Patterns of conflict
Throughout this period, police reinforcements were deploying into Mare Street where substantial conflict took place between 'rioters' and police. Some people broke into the large Tesco supermarket and took bottles. But this was not primarily for loot. One man shouted: "grab some missiles bro', just grab some missiles." [V7] But there were also some attacks (albeit limited) on property in the vicinity -a Carhartt Designer outlet store was looted and a Mazda MX5 sports car was burnt. At about this time, a news team located to the north of the Narrow Way stopped and interviewed one of the 'rioters' about his involvement.
He responded by referring to a continuous experience of police mistreatment exemplified by the shooting of Mark Duggan:
The Five O [police] on this manor [district] take the piss. They rough up the man dem, they take liberties and at the end of the day it was inevitable. You can't go around hassling people, taking the piss out of people because this is what is going to happen. The police take the piss. At the end of the day they gunned down a man for nothing.
As the interviewer struggled to understand the link between the patterns of riot around him and Duggan's death, the rioter explained: On the other hand there is an insistence that attacks on property are a form of politics. They are not just about individual access to consumer goods (though that is not denied); they also impose a cost on the opposition in order to effect a change in intergroup relations -and even if they don't at least they give this antagonist a taste of their own medicine, which is a pleasure in itself. This Here a local convenience store was broken into and extensively looted. But this appears to be one of only a few shops that were attacked in the vicinity.
A short while later the police moved en masse up Clarence Road. As they did so a Nissan Micra parked close to the convenience store was set alight and was soon burning fiercely. The flames rapidly took hold and as they did, wind took the flames onto an adjacent house. Some of those in the crowd realised that the house contained a family with a baby. Some of the rioters rushed to assist the family's escape. 
Points of significance
The most striking thing about the Hackney riot is the continuity with Tottenham.
Both events occur against a background of police-community antagonisms, which are then crystallised in specific antagonistic encounters that serve as precursors to generalised violence. Attacks on police personnel and property were systematic and sustained. There is no evidence of deliberate attacks on private individuals; indeed when such people were under threat from crowd actions (as in the case of spreading car fire) they were helped. There were some attacks on private property -always in the context of anti-police violence -but these were sporadic and sparse. Moreover, while consumerist motives may have been involved, acts of looting were relatively scarce in Hackney and difficult to separate from the assertion of crowd power and police powerlessness. In sum, Hackney was a political grievance based riot in much the same way as Tottenham.
The main difference between the two events was Tottenham itself. That is, the foregoing riots changed the context and the self-understanding of rioters in Hackney. They began with a heightened sense of grievance, a sense of empowerment and an unwillingness to tolerate encounters with the police that they experienced as oppressive. Throughout the events 'rioters' sought to, and took delight in expression of power, whether that was a matter of smashing things up or ambushing the police on the Pembury Estate.
Discussion
Empirically, the patterns we have described in Tottenham and Hackney support Newburn et al's (2015) contention that "many of the rioters shared…. strongly antagonistic attitudes toward, and specific grievance with, the police" (p. 59). It also adds empirical weight to Newburn et al.'s (2015) warning against overstating the role of consumerist culture and underplaying "those elements of the 2011 England riots that did not involve the desire to do some shopping for free" (p.1001). Correspondingly, our analysis of the events in Hackney challenges the argument that after Tottenham the riots became a matter merely of acquisitive nihilism.
Of course, those supporting the latter position could easily retort by arguing that it was after Tottenham and Hackney, the riots escaped their moorings. They could equally ask what about Tottenham Hale and other retail parks which were looted without any attacks on the police. As we acknowledged at the outset, practical limitations have led us to focus thus far on just two of the many events during August 2011 and this does affect our capacity to generalise to the riots as a whole. There is therefore a pressing need to conduct similarly detailed analyses of other 'riots' which took different forms, including what have been termed 'commodity riots' (Ball & Drury, 2012; Reicher & Stott, 2011) . But as has been pointed out elsewhere the mere fact that riots target consumer goods is not, in itself, evidence for individualism, consumerism, or lack of solidarity. Indeed, this study along with others simply emphasises the danger of reading too rigid a conceptual divide between anti-police action and looting (cf. Akram, 2014; Ball & Drury, 2012; Newburn et al, 2015) . First, while there was looting and damaging of property in both riots, it appears to have been relatively sporadic, and in Hackney actually quite limited in scale. Second, the looting that was identified appears to have been linked to conflict with the police in the sense that it was characteristically both in the vicinity and aftermath of anti-police action. Third, there is some evidence that the looting and damage that did occur was patterned, with 'insider' shops in Tottenham generally either being left alone or collectively defended. Fourth, insofar as it is the responsibility of the police to stop property damage, one cannot separate attacks on property from relations with the police. Insofar as rioters were able to mount such attacks with impunity, they signify police impotence. In the course of both riots there were at least some that openly celebrated attacks on property as such; 'opportunism' became another way asserting power over the police (Guardian/LSE, 2011).
We are reminded here of Eric Hobsbawm's (1952) Moving, now, to the theoretical dimension, our analysis shows that an account of the broad context -whether it be consumerist ideology or grievances against the police -may be necessary but it certainly isn't sufficient to make sense of the August 2011 riots. This is exemplified by the shooting of Mark Duggan, often seen as the 'flashpoint'. But it was two days before rioting actually began, during which a series of interactions with the police took place which appear to have undermined those voices calling for resolution through dialogue and given increasing credibility to those arguing that the police would only listen to force.
In Hackney too there were also a series of interactions involving a 'stop and search' and then subsequent dispersal tactic exercised by the police, interactions that appear to have been central to the dynamics of the rioting in London.
David Waddington et al's (1987) 'Flashpoints' theory, argues that background history, meanings and material social structures are important in determining whether 'riots' will or will not take place. This position appears to be validated by our data. However, Flashpoints makes clear that these background contexts do not mechanically determine riots. Rather they are understood to frame and give meaning to other processes that occur at the level of interaction. This study therefore contributes to Flashpoints primarily through its capacity to provide a detailed theoretical account of precisely how such interactions led to the presence of rioting during the first and the largest of these series of events.
Nonetheless our claims must be measured against the limitations of our data. We have examined just two of the estimated 141 incidents across 66 different areas (Riots, Communities and Victims Panel, 2011) . Our small sample severely restricts our capacity to generalise to the 2011 riots as a whole and highlights the need for more research on these other incidents in other locations. Our sampling of data from within the two events was also largely opportunistic. We therefore have no way of identifying all of the events and collective actions that took place. Therefore we cannot be certain that events always occurred in the sequential order we have assumed and there may be important incidents that were not recorded, posted or identified in any of the sources of informal and formal evidence we have drawn from. Nonetheless the sample we have obtained does allow for direct and often triangulated observations and detailed analysis of the behaviour and verbal utterances of people involved in vivo across the events in question.
As with Useem and Kimball's (1987) criminological analysis of prison riots our turn toward social identity helps to explain how the observed patterns of collective action reflected existing categories, ideologies and social relations (cf. Carrabine, 2005; Sparks et al, 1996) . Our social psychological approach helps to understand the crowd processes underpinning the production of new social identities, beliefs and social relations in a way that helps account for the specific development, escalation and spread of these two riots. Our analysis is consistent with the following explanation of intergroup dynamics. First, police fears about danger led them to act toward gathering crowds aggressively and assertively.
This undifferentiated use of force created unity amongst crowd participants, both legitimising and empowering collective confrontation. Such processes contributed towards the inversion of power relations between police and those in the community -something that appears to have framed and fed interactions later in the evening and in subsequent rioting. Thus, while embedded within a specific structural and ideological context there was nothing inevitable about the Tottenham riot; it required a whole series of interactions before it happened.
Equally, Hackney appears to have involved similar interactive and escalatory social psychological processes.
Thus, far from being a psychology that desocialises and pathologises crowd action, it is an approach that helps relate distal and proximal contexts to action in a way that helps explain the social patterning of crowd action and change. In this sense it is a perspective that demonstrates the value of bringing sociological and social psychological analyses of riot together. In so doing we hope to have articulated how this inter-disciplinary approach within criminology provides a richer and deeper perspective on these complex social phenomena.
